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Abstract 
Big-data collected from On-Train Data Recorders (OTDR) could be used to tackle the most 
important strategic risk issues currently faced by rail operators and authorities worldwide.  
These risk issues are increasingly orientated around Human Factors.  We prove the concept 
that long standing Human Factors methods can be driven from big-data, moreover, that their 
outputs speak directly towards improving the accuracy of future predictions.  Over 300 
Human Factors methods were reviewed and a smaller sub-set selected for proof-of-concept 
development using real on-train recorder data.  From this are derived nine candidate Human 
Factors leading indicators which map on to all of the psychological precursors of the 
identified strategic risks.  The intersection of psychological knowledge, Human Factors 
methods and big-data creates an important new framework for driving new insights and 
increasing the accuracy of predictions.   
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Introduction 
Data recording is the act of automatically logging information on system parameters over 
time.  Data recording has become increasingly ubiquitous in rail transport operations and 
easily qualifies as a ‘big data’ problem (e.g. Wu & Liu, 2014; Geisler et al., 2011).  Entire 
national train fleets are now required to carry recorders which continuously extract data on 
how individual trains are being driven, at increasing rates, and across an increasing range of 
parameters.  The outflow of data is therefore extensive and growing in terms of volume, 
velocity and variety (Laney, 2001).  Perhaps because of this, and the conceptual challenges 
involved in storing and mining such large quantities, the data is currently underused (Hart, 
2003).  What could it be used for?  In this paper we argue it could be used to tackle the most 
important strategic risk issues currently faced by rail operators and authorities worldwide.   
 
The Spanish train crash in July 2013 reveals yet again that the interface of humans and 
machine systems is key (Evans, 2011; EU, 2003; RSSB, 2009).  Having closed off 
numerous other technical/engineering opportunities for accidents to occur what is left is a 
troubling class of accident which arises despite highly trained and motivated personnel, the 
presence of robust safety management practices, and state of the art infrastructure.  More 
worryingly, the methods and approaches that have helped us achieve the current high levels 
of railway safety seem to be less effective in the face of human/system problems such as 
these.  By using big-data as an input to long standing Human Factors methods, however, we 
can embark on an important research agenda that takes us towards leading indicators of 
strategic risks of precisely this sort.  In this paper four proof-of-concept demonstrators are 
realised, tested with real-world train data recordings, and presented as a highly novel 
framework for driving new insights and increasing the accuracy of predictions.   
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The Black Box Paradox 
The intersection of big-data and the rail transport context embodies three paradoxes.  Firstly, 
because so few major rail accidents occur there is no longer enough data to construct 
reliable forward looking estimates (Evans, 2011).  When safety performance data reaches 
the level of that achieved in the rail sector it instead starts to become characterised by 
unpredictable periodicities, cycles or discrete events.  This is becoming evident in EU rail 
safety data, with a large scale rail accident (on the scale of the recent Spanish rail crash) 
occurring on average every six years (EU, 2003).  Safety data is ‘levelling off’ with a 
persistent class of human/system accident now elevated to the status of a key risk (RSSB, 
2009; Stanton & Walker, 2011).  Secondly, “there is widespread concern within the industry 
that the background indicators – rather than the headline grabbing ones – have remained 
worryingly stable” (Wolmar, 2012).  An example of this is UK data on Signals Passed At 
Danger (SPAD) incidents.  As a class of accident/near-accident SPADs have been the focus 
of sustained attention and research in every decade since the British Transport Commission 
initiated the first Medical Research Council studies of the 1960’s.  Considerable progress on 
SPADs has been made but despite the introduction of the Automatic Warning System 
(1950s), modern colour light signalling (1960s), improved train braking performance (1970s 
), and subsequently a new Train Protection and Warning System (1990s/2000s), SPADs still 
occur (McLeod, Walker & Moray, 2005).  Data for the past three years indicates in the region 
of 20 to 30 SPADs per month, approximately half of which fall into high risk categories.  
More worryingly there has been comparatively little variation in the overall SPAD rate.  For 
example, the rate for Quarter 4 2012 is the same as Quarter 3, and indeed the same (or very 
nearly the same) as on seven previous reporting periods since 2005 (e.g. ORR, 2012).  The 
third and final paradox is that the opportunities to use On-Train Data Recorders (OTDRs) for 
their original purpose (i.e. post-accident analysis) are diminishing at the same time as the 
technical capabilities of data recorders are increasing (Geisler et al., 2011; Morcom, 1970).  
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What this means is that Exabyte’s of non-accident data are being collected day in and day 
out, but not currently used.  The opportunity embedded in this is to use big data from 
transport recordings to detect accident precursors, but specifically those accidents which 
have proven resistant to our current approaches and which are responsible for the current 
plateauing of accident trends.   
 
Human Factors Leading Indicators 
Leading indicators are measurable precursors to major events such as an accident.  The 
indication of a precursor ‘leads’, or comes before, the actual event itself.  Lagging indicators 
are the opposite.  These are so called ‘loss metrics’ that can only become apparent after an 
event (Rogers, Evans & Wright, 2009).  Leading indicators are said to be ‘proactive’ because 
they enable steps to be taken to avoid seriously adverse consequences.  Lagging indicators 
are said to be ‘reactive’ in that a seriously adverse event needs to occur before it can be 
learnt from.  For this reason, leading indicators are also sometimes referred to as ‘positive 
performance indicators’ and lagging indicators as ‘negative performance indicators’.  The 
concept of leading and lagging indicators originally derives from the field of economics and 
the need to understand ‘business cycles’ and to predict when one phase of a ‘cyclical 
process’ such as this will change to another (Mitchell & Burns, 1938).  The terms have been 
appropriated more recently by the safety and risk field, particularly in view of developments 
in Safety Management Systems (SMS) since the 1990’s.  Leading indicators, in a Safety 
Management context, can be defined as “something that provides information that helps the 
user respond to changing circumstances and take actions to achieve desired outcomes or 
avoid unwanted outcomes” (Step Change, 2003, p. 3).  That ‘something’ can be defined 
according to the risk factors underlying the troublesome class of operational accident (or 
near accident) that is the focus of this paper.    
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The reason for the emphasis on Human Factors can be seen in the ‘broad causes’ attributed 
to recent rail accidents.  Out of seven ‘broad causes’ attributable to European rail accident 
data, four out of seven, including the top three, involve a prominent Human Factors 
dimension (Evans, 2011).  Expressed in descriptive terms, people in these scenarios either 
‘get out of sequence’, ‘lost situational awareness’, ‘allocated attention incorrectly, ‘allowed 
prior experience to override the correct action’ or combinations of all four, as shown in Table 
1.  A comprehensive review of the psychological literature (reported elsewhere, Walker & 
Strathie, 2012) linked these descriptive terms to a set of specific and robust risk factors 
(these are also shown in Table 1).  If we are able to detect when these risk factors are 
present, using big-data as the input, then we should also be able to make progress on key 
strategic Human Factors risks.   
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Table 1 – Strategic risk issues, descriptive causes, underlying Human Factors risks and their source in the wider literature 
Human Factors 
accidents 
“Getting out of sequence” “Loss of situational 
awareness” 
“Faulty allocation of 
attention” 
“Prior experience 
overrides correct action” 
Signal Passed At Danger     
Signalling Error     
Over-Speeding     
Other Operational Error     
 
 Risk Factor Selected references 
“Getting out of sequence” • Task interruptions 
• Where an unusual response must be made at a future point in time 
• A device or system that only needs infrequent monitoring 
• Removal of normal environmental cues that trigger habitual behaviour  
• When circumstances mean that a driver/air crew must deviate from a well-practiced 
procedure in a single respect. 
• Performing monitoring tasks may negatively impact (slow) the main task. 
Graf, 2011; Park et al. 1997; 
Dismukes, 2007; Meacham & 
Leiman, 1982; Hicks, Marsh 
and Cook, 2005; Loft, Smith 
and Bhaskara, 2011. 
“Loss of situational 
awareness” 
• Information in the environment which is required to ensure successful task performance 
is either not present, or not detected.   
• Failure to understand what the environmental cues received (or not received) might 
mean.   
• Failure to accurately project future states (and take appropriate action) based on cues 
perceived and understanding gained. 
Endsley, 2012; Stanton, 
Chambers & Piggot, 2001; 
Gobert, 1998; Salmon et al., 
2009. 
“Faulty allocation of 
attention” 
• When attention is focused on completing a central goal, unexpected events may be 
more difficult to detect. 
• When attention is distracted, or is spread across a number of demanding tasks, 
performance will suffer. 
McMains & Kastner, 2011; 
Groeger et al., 2005; 
Neisser, 1979; Simons & 
Chabris, 1999.  
“Prior experience 
overrides correct action” 
• Highly routine journeys, particularly where there are long periods during which minimal 
inputs/responses are required. 
• Experienced drivers/pilots, for whom the tasks have become part of a procedure that 
doesn’t require conscious thought. 
• Systems with more than one mode, where the same responses can produce different 
outcomes depending on the mode the system is in. 
Bartlett, 1932; Ferris, Sarter 
& Wickens, 2010; Norman, 
1981. 
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• Where the driver/pilot receives conflicting information which results in a situation being 
misclassified. 
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The basic ‘research problem’ can be stated thus: despite considerable improvements in 
safety performance in the rail sector, a persistent class of accident/near accident continues 
to occur.  These incidents reside at the interface of people and systems.  What is required is 
a means to detect the presence or emergence of such problems before they manifest 
themselves as a serious operational accident.  This paper describes how big data from 
OTDRs can be used to ‘drive’ established Human Factors methods to provide leading 
indicators of specific risk factors.  What are presented are four proof-of-concept 
demonstrators which show how these approaches work, selected on the basis of their 
potential scalability when used with big-data.   
 
Methodology 
Data File and Parameters 
The study uses real-world On-Train Data Recording (OTDR) data.  The OTDR data file is a 
continuous download from a single traction unit.  The recording started at 05:34:57 on the 
6th July 2012 and ceased at 21:36.32 on the 11th July 2012.  This is a period of 136 hours, 
1minute and 35 seconds during which the train made 107 journeys and travelled 1638 miles.  
The raw data takes the form of a Comma Separated (CSV) file containing a data matrix 
191,021 time samples (rows) deep by 72 parameters (columns) wide: a total of 13.8 million 
data points.  The logger itself scans the parameters for changes at a rate of 20mS but, in the 
present system, to economise on memory requirements data are only logged when one of 
the 72 parameters changes (up to the maximum scanning/sampling rate).  In the present 
case the mean sampling rate was 2.56 seconds.  The OTDR device itself was a UK Railway 
Group Standards compliant Arrowvale unit which recorded 72 parameters, 25 of which are in 
addition to those mandated.  In terms of data classification four of the parameters; time, 
distance and two speed signals derived from a driven and non-driven axle, are continuous 
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ratio data.  The remaining 68 are nominal/binomial (i.e. on or off).  Explanations for the 
channels relevant to the present analyses are contained in the proof of concept descriptions.   
 
Rolling Stock 
The sample of OTDR data was obtained from a Class 153 ‘super sprinter’, unit number 153 
306.  This is a single-unit diesel powered railcar built between 1987 and 1988.  Class 153s 
are 23.2 meters in length and have an un-laden weight of 41.2 tons.  They seat 72 
passengers, comprise a riveted aluminium body shell affixed to a steel under-frame, and are 
equipped with four electrically powered single-leaf Bode doors.  The prime-mover is an 
under-slung turbocharged 6 cylinder Cummins NT855 diesel engine producing 285bhp.  A 
Cummins-Voith T211r hydraulic transmission drives both axles of the leading BT38 bogie via 
a Gmeinder final drive.  The Unit’s maximum operating speed is 75mph.  It is fitted with 
electro-pneumatic clasp brakes, with cast iron brake pads acting directly on the tread of the 
wheel(s) via compressed air actuation.  Air suspension is provided for additional passenger 
comfort and refinement.  Tight-lock compact BSI auto-couplers mean that Class 153’s can 
work flexibly in unison with several other multiple unit classes but the present unit worked 
solo for the duration of the data collection period.   
 
Journeys and Routes 
Data collection took place on the Great Eastern (Route 7) and West Anglia (Route 5) regions 
of Network Rail.  The strategic ‘backbone’ of the Great Eastern region is the Great Eastern 
Main Line (GMEL) originating from London Liverpool Street and travelling North East to 
Norwich.  There are numerous branch lines attached to the GMEL providing services to 
commuter areas such as Upminster, Southend and Colchester, to important freight hubs 
such as Harwich and Felixstowe, and to more remote communities in East Anglia such as 
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Sudbury, Cromer and Sheringham.  Route 7 (Great Eastern) joins Route 5 (West Anglia) at 
Haughley Junction, approximately 14 miles from Ipswich, where a secondary route runs 
West towards Cambridge, Ely and Peterborough.  The journey diagram for unit 153 306 
between 6th and 11th July 2012 is shown in Figure 1 along with the technical characteristics 
of those routes in Table 2. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Journey diagram for unit 153 306 between 6th and 11th July 2012 
(excluding local, non-revenue movements of less than 5 miles).  Values and line 
thickness indicate number of journeys made between nodes in the network.   
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Table 2 - Route characteristics 
Route  Class Freight Gauge Electrification Route Availability Speed Signalling Type No of Tracks 
Great Eastern Mainline Route 7 Primary W10(W9) 25kV AC 8 90(70) TCB 4(6) 
Ipswich - Cambridge Route 5 Secondary W10(W9) None 8 75 TCB(AB) 2(1) 
Felixstowe – Ipswich Route 7 Secondary W6(W8) None 7 50 TCB 1(2) 
Sudbury – Marks Tey Route 7 Rural W6 None 6 50 OTW 1 
East Suffolk line and Norfolk Branches Route 7 Rural W6(W8) None 7(6) Varies RETB (and other types) Varies 
 
Freight Gauge W6 represents ‘standard’ British Railway dimensions for rail vehicles.  W8 compatible routes 
permit the use of larger/longer shipping container trains.  W10 permits 2.9 meter ‘Hi Cube’ 
containers and 2.5m ‘Euro Containers’. 
Route Availability Principally refers to axle loadings.  An RA of 6 equates to a maximum of 20.3 tonnes.  An RA 
of 8 equates to a maximum of 24.1 tonnes. 
Signalling Type Track Circuit Block signalling in which train detection is automatic and train control is 
(typically) via coloured light lineside signals.  OTW = One Train Working, wherein only one 
train is permitted into a section protected by signalling ‘interlocks’ until the train leaves the 
section.  RETB = Radio Electronic Token Block, a form of signalling in which a signaller 
passes an electronic token to the train cab giving permission for it to enter a section of track.   
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Human Factors Methods 
Human Factors (HF) methods provide an explicit way of linking theories on human 
performance and capabilities to practical situations such as rail operations.  Methods are an 
integral part of the Human Factors discipline (see Stanton et al., 2013 and Karwowski, 
2001).  The normal inputs to Human Factors methods vary, but common to them all is scale.  
It is common for methods to be applied to individual scenarios, to accidents/incidents that 
have already happened, and in rarer cases, to the analysis of entities the size of an 
organisation.  There is no inherent limitation on the scalability of some of the methods, and 
likewise, no conceptual reason why some methods cannot accept big-data as an input.  A 
systematic methods review was performed to identify candidate methods. 
 
Stage 1 –Review of Existing HF Methods 
The result of an initial methods review was a database of over 300 Human Factors methods 
and techniques, grouped into eleven categories as shown in Table 3.   
 
Table 3- HF method categories 
Method category Brief Description 
Data collection techniques Data collection techniques are used to collect specific data 
regarding a system or scenario.    
Task Analysis techniques Task analysis techniques are used to represent human 
performance.  They do this by breaking down tasks or 
scenarios into the required individual task steps, and using 
these steps to diagnose important human 
performance/psychological parameters. 
Cognitive Task analysis techniques Cognitive task analysis (CTA) techniques are used to 
describe and represent the unobservable cognitive aspects 
of task performance.   
Charting techniques Charting techniques are used to depict graphically a task or 
process using standardised symbols.  The output of 
charting techniques can be used to understand the different 
task steps involved in a particular scenario, and also to 
highlight when each task step should occur and which 
technological aspect of the system is required.   
Human Error Investigation (HEI) and 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
techniques 
HEI techniques are used to predict any potential 
human/operator error that may occur.  HRA techniques are 
used to quantify the probability of error occurrence. 
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Situation Awareness assessment 
techniques 
Situation Awareness (SA) refers to an operator’s knowledge 
and understanding of the situation that he or she is placed 
in.  SA assessment techniques are used to extract a 
measure of operator SA while at work within systems.  
Mental Workload assessment 
techniques 
Mental workload represents the proportion of operator 
resources demanded by a task or set of tasks.   
Team Performance Analysis techniques Various facets of team performance can be evaluated, 
including communication, decision-making, awareness, 
workload and co-ordination. 
Interface Analysis techniques Interface analysis techniques are used to assess the 
interface of a system in terms of usability, error, user-
satisfaction and layout. 
 
Stage 2 – Initial Methods Screening 
Before the HF techniques were subject to further analysis, a screening process was 
employed to remove any that were not suitable for further consideration due to the following: 
 
• Unavailable – some methods are proprietary.  In order to be included, the method 
should be freely available in the public domain.   
• Inapplicable –those methods that did not refer directly or indirectly to the design 
and analysis of systems, or that were too specialised to be applicable to transport 
systems, were rejected.   
• Duplication – HF methods are sometimes re-iterated and presented in a new 
format.  Any methods that were very similar to other methods already chosen for 
review were rejected (the version in most common usage and/or most 
appropriate to transportation environments being selected instead).   
• Limited use –quite often a method is developed and not used by anyone other 
than the developer.  Any methods that had not been applied in a practical 
analysis of some sort were rejected. 
 
As a result of the method screening procedure a list of 87 methods suitable for use within 
transport systems was created.   
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Stage 3 – Methods Review 
The 87 HF design and evaluation methods were then analysed with respect to the simple 
question “could the method accept recorder data as an input” and “what output would it 
provide”.  Table 3 presents the list of candidate methods and their possible contribution to 
the analysis of big-data.  The methods met a further three criteria:  
 
1. “can the method be ‘demonstrated’ within reasonable timescales and cost”  
2. “constrained by (1) does the method add sufficient value in terms of Human 
Factors leading indicators” 
3. “could the method (at this early stage of analysis) be feasibly automated such 
that it would require low overhead in terms of external validation, and be 
compatible with software-based approaches to the management of big-data” 
 
Table 4 – List of candidate methods 
Method Outputs 
Workload (Primary Task 
Measures) 
Data recording parameters divided into mental (i.e. warning 
received etc.) and physical (i.e. control moved etc.) workload 
categories.  Enables crude moment to moment assessment of 
workload based directly on activity occurring in data recording 
channels. 
Process Charts Activities, processes, sequences presented in graphical format 
against common timeline with standardised symbol set.  
Potentially offers a more ‘user friendly’, higher level, human 
activity-based representation compared to raw ‘trace plots’. 
Link analysis Nature, frequency and importance of 
movements/communications between system elements and 
human operators based on recorder channel activations. 
Signal Detection Theory Response types, categories and timing used to calculate 
measures of sensitivity and decision bias. 
 
Proofs of Concept 
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Having linked HF methods to strategic risks on the railway, and revealed the possibility to 
drive these methods from big-data, this section proceeds to apply them to the OTDR 
dataset.  A brief description of the underlying variables being measured is provided, and the 
method of application described.  Even though the data set comprises in the region of 13 
million data points and is, in big-data terms, relatively small, it is clear that useful and 
interesting outputs were emerging with comparative ease.   
 
Workload Profiles 
Brief description 
Individuals possess a malleable but ultimately finite attentional resource (e.g. Young & 
Stanton, 2002).  Mental Workload represents the proportion of that resource demanded by a 
task at any given moment.  Excessive demand (over-load) or lack of demand (under-load) 
can lead to performance problems, in particular, with attention being allocated incorrectly 
(Theeuwes, 1991).  A simple but effective indication of workload can be provided directly 
from transport data recordings.  Certain data recording channels can be associated with 
mental demand, others with physical demand.  As a journey progress a form of workload 
profile can be derived and analysed to identify the demands being placed on attentional 
resources.   
 
Method 
The proof of concept was tested using a single railway journey from Marks Tey to Sudbury, a 
distance of 18.5 Km.  The 72 parameters extracted from the data recorder were classified 
into: 
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1. those that impose a mental demand (e.g. such as an alarm or warning sounding 
in the cab) 
2. a physical demand (e.g. moving the power or brake controllers) 
3. both physical and mental demand 
4. neither 
 
This gave 14 parameters that relate to mental demand, 20 that relate to physical demand, 6 
that relate to both physical and mental demands and 32 that directly relate to neither.  Each 
time one of the parameters changed was recorded in the appropriate category.  For the 
journey selected this gave an overall load of 371 channel activations, 145 (39%) for mental 
workload and 226 (61%) for physical workload.   
 
Outputs 
To create a workload profile, the journey was divided into periods of 10 seconds, and the 
number of parameters that altered in each was recorded.  Figure 2 reveals how mental and 
physical demands are distributed across a journey, and when workload might be particularly 
high or low.  Overlain on this graph are some further explanatory curves: as the journey 
progresses from sampling intervals 17-25 how workload declines to a low level.  The 
psychological literature informs us that after approximately 30 minutes of low demand we 
could expect to observe a vigilance decrement.  Depending on the task and context, this can 
yield a 10/15% reduction in human performance (e.g. Eysenck, 1982; Mackworth, 1948).  
Time elapsed since workload exceeded a previous value is therefore one indication of 
potential attention-based risks.  The other indication is when a sudden change (as occurs in 
sampling interval 117) follows a long period of low demand.  Again, the psychological 
literature informs us that attentional resources cannot expand to new demands 
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instantaneously and that performance problems can arise while they do (e.g. Stanton, Young 
& McCaulder, 1997).   
 
 
Figure 2 – Recorder channels allocated to mental and physical workload categories 
and their activation mapped to an actual route.   
 
What are the leading indicators? 
Leading Indicator 1:  Conventional event detection based on comparing individual samples 
of workload with mean values across journeys/journey segments/driver population(s) etc.  In 
a wider application, averaging across multiple journeys on the same route, it may be 
possible to build up a profile of how workload is distributed under typical driving conditions.  
If changes in the profile appear, this may offer an indication that something has altered in 
driving conditions that was impacting on drivers.   
 
LEADING INDICATOR
Time elapsed since mental demand 
exceeded threshold level
Attentional resources decline 
when workload is low
Alert Warn
Onset of vigilance decrement approx. 30 minutes –
10/15% performance reduction.  Ability to respond to 
sudden workload changes compromised*
LEADING INDICATOR
Rate/magnitude of 
change in workload 
vs time elapsed since 
last significant 
change
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Leading Indicator 2:  Time elapsed since a ‘significant’ change in workload based on 
psychological theories of vigilance.  While drivers may be more vulnerable to errors during 
periods of high load, extended periods of low workload can also be problematic.  Theoretical 
knowledge on human performance under the specific conditions pertaining in rail settings 
could be used to define when occurrences like these constitute early warning of 
unacceptable risk.   
 
Leading Indicator 3:  A ‘significant’ workload event occurs after a pre-set length of time at 
low workload has been exceeded.  While the example journey analysed here identified 
periods of high load on arrival and departure from stations (which may not be unexpected), 
longer journeys on more complex infrastructure may create additional periods of high 
workload, which may inform practice.  The ability to respond appropriately to these changes 
depends on the magnitude and rate of workload change, and the period of time prior to the 
change during which low levels of workload were experienced.   
 
Type of Risk Detected:  Getting out of sequence because of task interruptions, and/or an 
unusual response being required.  Faulty allocation of attention due to unexpected events, 
distractors or when attention is spread across a range of demanding tasks.  Prior experience 
overriding correct action due to long periods where minimal inputs/responses are required. 
 
Process Charts 
Brief description 
Process charting techniques are used to represent complex real-world activity in an easy to 
read graphical format using standardised symbols and layout (Stanton et al., 2013).  The 
Process Chart methodology has an extremely long legacy and history of use.  Early 
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examples date from the 1920’s (Gilbreth & Gilbreth, 1921) and it has been used extensively 
in military and high hazard domains as a way of understanding the interaction between 
people and systems, particularly in terms of identifying human error potential.  In this 
application, process charts offer a novel way of converting raw ‘trace plots’ derived from data 
recorders into an alternative representation, one that makes it easier to discern how larger 
journey phases break down into smaller component activities, the order and timing that 
component activities occur, who is performing what activity and the presence of distinct 
activity clusters.   
 
Method 
The proof of concept was tested using several journey segments spanning a range of 
different activities and contexts.  The 72 parameters extracted from the data recorder were 
classified into: 
 
Once all of the recorder channels have been classified into the appropriate symbol 
categories, the process chart itself can be constructed.  This involves creating a timeline and 
columns for each ‘agent’ in the system.  In the case of the railway example six such 
agents/columns have been used: 
Walker, G. H. & Strathie, A. (2016).  Big data and ergonomics methods: a new paradigm for tackling strategic 
transport safety risks.  Applied Ergonomics, 53, 298-311 
 
1. Driver 
2. Guard 
3. Passengers 
4. Train 
5. Signalling / Track 
6. External Environment 
 
As different recorder channels become active, the corresponding process chart symbol is 
inserted into the relevant column at the correct point on the timeline.  The sequence of 
activities and their dependence on each other defines when these symbols are linked.  Thus 
an activity/symbol that occurs after another activity/symbol becomes linked ‘vertically’.  
Activities that are performed concurrently are linked ‘horizontally’.   
 
Output 
Figure 3 shows how the channel activations associated with a station departure can be 
converted into a Process Chart.  The boxes have been added to provide a narrative of the 
activities being performed.   
 
Figure 3 – Process chart depicting activities/actors associated with departing from 
a station 
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The simplest output to be derived from a Process Chart, one that links to the Workload 
Profile above, is an Operations Loading table.  This shows how ‘busy’ each agent in the 
system is.  Whilst the Workload Profile technique provides a high level overview of workload 
according to Mental and Physical Demand, the Process Chart Method provides a more 
detailed assessment broken down by different ‘actors’ in the scenario and specific 
task/operation types.  It is also important to note that the ‘agents/actors’ represented in the 
Process Chart are human (i.e. drivers, passengers, guards etc.) and non-human (the train 
itself, the track and signalling infrastructure and so on).  The points at which these different 
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actors/agents have to interact are clearly shown, along with any potential problems with that 
interaction in terms of missing information, out-of-sequence and/or overly demanding 
activities.   
 
Table 5 – Operations loading table 
 Driver Guard Passenger Train Signalling/ 
Track 
External 
Environment 
Decision 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Action 3 4 0 3 0 0 
Transmit 
Information 
3 4 0 0 1 0 
Receive Information 2 0 0 3 0 0 
Total Load 9 8 0 6 1 0 
 
The simplifying effect of converting raw trace plots into Process Charts enables meaningful 
patterns to be better detected and thus made more amenable to automatic detection.  
Process Charts also help in the identification of interruptions to the normal sequence of 
activities and in providing leading indicators around the issue of ‘prospective memory’.  
Having the ability to detect behavioural clusters also grants the opportunity to assess 
whether such structures are typical or atypical.  Indeed, whether they are one of a number of 
different behavioural responses within a wider repertoire, and whether one cluster of 
behaviour is implicated in risk outcomes more than another, and under what circumstances.  
Despite only having access to a comparatively small sample of data distinct patterns of 
behaviour were still evident.  Below are three different ‘clusters’ of behaviour for performing 
the same task (cancelling an AWS warning by pressing a button when a horn-sound is 
heard).  The first cluster is the normative ‘perceive-decide-act’ sequence.  Here the 
infrastructure on the track triggers an in-cab warning horn.  The driver perceives (hears) this, 
has enough time to classify it (0.89 seconds) and respond by pressing the cancellation 
button.  The second cluster is the ‘predictive cancel’ sequence.  In this case the 
infrastructure on track triggers the in-cab warning horn but the driver responds so quickly 
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that it is not possible to have perceived, classified and responded to the warning.  Instead, 
the driver has seen the track infrastructure and has anticipated the in-cab warning and timed 
their response to coincide with it starting.  The third cluster is the ‘multiple predictive cancel’ 
sequence.  As in cluster two, the driver can see the track infrastructure ahead and is 
pressing the cancellation button numerous times before hearing the in-cab warning horn, 
and several times after the warning has sounded and been cancelled.  Driver behaviour with 
AWS has been implicated in several high profile rail accidents (e.g. Cullen, 2001; Uff, 2000) 
 
 
Figure 4 - Three clusters of behaviour associated with cancelling an Automatic 
Warning System (AWS) alert were detected 
 
What are the leading indicators? 
Leading Indicator 4:  Operations loading as a means of detecting normal/abnormal workload 
across different agents/actors in the system.  It also reveals the different ‘modalities’ by 
which different parts of the system communicate with each other revealing, in turn, sensory 
channels that might be over or under-relied upon.   
 
Leading Indicator 5:  The extraction and definition of behavioural clusters which, in turn, can 
be explored for their possible impacts on overall risk.  Clusters are defined by structure and 
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sequence of operations.  Operations that occur too much or too little, too late or too early, 
out of sequence or unexpectedly, can be detected.   
 
Type of Risk Detected:  Getting out of sequence because of task interruptions, unusual 
future responses being required, removal of normal environmental cues that trigger habitual 
behaviour, and deviations from well-practised routines.  Loss of situational awareness due to 
missing information that would normally come from other elements of the system.  Faulty 
allocation of attention due to unexpected events.  Prior experience that overrides correct 
action because of high routine and minimal (new) inputs, changes in system mode meaning 
that a routine behaviour now causes a different outcome, and conflicting information 
resulting in situations being misclassified.   
 
Link Analysis 
Brief Description 
Link analysis is used to identify and represent ‘links’ between interface components and 
human operations, and to determine the nature, frequency and importance of these links.  
Links are defined by a driver’s interaction with their cab interface.  For example, if someone 
is required to press button A and then button B in sequence a link between buttons’ A and B 
is recorded.  The data matrix created by populating the frequency of these links can be 
subject to analysis via Graph Theory techniques.  Graph Theory is a well-established branch 
of applied mathematics with a long history of application in different domains.  Foundational 
work in this area occurred well over a century ago and recognisably modern developments 
occurred from the 1930’s onwards.  Graph Theory is applied to the analysis of biological, 
sociological, demographic, economic and computing networks to name just a few.  Link 
Analysis, in which similar principles are applied to ‘interface networks’ is a more recent 
development but nonetheless performs particularly well on measures of reliability (e.g. 
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Stanton & Young, 1999).  In this application, link diagrams can be driven directly from 
recorder data to provide a novel way of detecting events based on people’s physical 
interactions with technology.   
 
Method 
Defining the links between components of a user interface is normally achieved by a 
walkthrough or observational study of the task(s) under analysis.  Recorder data avoids the 
need for this.  Human interactions with cab or cockpit interfaces can be monitored directly 
based on the changing activation of recorder channels related to cab/cockpit interfaces as 
shown in Figure 5.  For this proof of concept demonstration link analyses performed on six 
drivers undertaking 17 journeys from Bures to Sudbury.   
 
 
Figure 5 – Diagram illustrating the application of link analysis 
 
Outputs 
The pattern of control activities across all 17 journeys is summarised in the network diagram 
in Figure 6.  This gives a visual representation of the pattern of connections that were 
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produced across all drivers and journeys in the analysis.  The link diagram shows that some 
components of the cab interface are more heavily interconnected than others (as 
represented by thicker connecting lines), that there is an ‘overall’ level of connectivity, and 
that the number of  links one needs to traverse to reach different pairs of nodes (controls) 
also differs.   
 
 
Figure 6 – Overall network diagram 
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To investigate whether individual drivers differ in their interactions with the cab interface and 
controls Graph Theory can be applied to the link matrices.  An example is the network metric 
centrality, given by the formula: 
Centrality =  
where the node with the greatest number of links converging upon it (CD(y*), that which has 
the highest ‘degree’, is used to derive centrality values for every other node in the network.  
Simply stated, centrality is a way to identify which part of the interface is more heavily 
connected, and therefore more prominent in the network, compared to others.  In practice, 
heavily connected nodes are more ‘visible’ to other nodes, serve as a conduit for control 
sequences more than other nodes, and will be subject to network influences more quickly 
and more often than other nodes.   
 
The results of an analysis of centrality performed on the six drivers responsible for 17 
journeys between Bures and Sudbury shows there is a distinct pattern identifying the 
importance of a control based on the number of times it is linked in sequence to another 
control.  In this case, for many drivers, the lower positions of the brake and power controllers 
are dominant.  Indeed, there is close concordance between all drivers in terms of the power 
controller, with progressively less emphasis given to higher power settings.  There is much 
greater variation in terms of brake controller usage and three distinct ‘signatures’ seem to 
emerge.  The first is the ‘mean signature’, which averages across all 17 journeys, and the 
one where equal and low importance is ascribed to all of the ‘running’ brake control positions 
(Steps 1 to 3 on the controller).  Then there is another group of drivers who ascribe 
descending importance to Steps 1 to 3.  The pattern for a third driver stands out from the 
group in that their responses cluster greatly around brake Step 2.  Distinct patterns such as 
these grant access to leading indicators around driver strategy and technique.   

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What are the leading indicators? 
Leading Indicator 6: Link analysis enables network diagrams to be created directly from 
recorder data.  These represent human interactions with control interfaces in a graphical 
format, showing link frequency, direction and strength.  Patterns of behaviour can be readily 
detected from these representations and potentially serve as leading indicators of driving 
technique.   
 
Leading Indicator 7: The results of Link Analyses can be expressed as single numbers 
through the use of Graph Theory.  Network metrics summarise different facets of human 
interaction with in cab/cockpit controls, such as response diversity, sequencing and 
clustering, and provide key performance indicators of when these interactions change.   
 
Type of Risk Detected:  Getting out of sequence because of task interruptions, unusual 
future responses being required, removal of normal environmental cues that trigger habitual 
behaviour, and deviations from well-practised routines: all of which are detectable via link 
diagrams and associated metrics.  Loss of situational awareness due to missing 
information/links between elements of the system.  Faulty allocation of attention due to 
experience/training related factors as revealed by driving strategies and signatures.  Prior 
experience that overrides correct action because of high routine and minimal (new) inputs, 
changes in system mode meaning that a routine cluster of links now causes a different 
outcome, and conflicting information/links resulting in situations being misclassified.   
 
Sensitivity and Decision Bias 
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Brief Description 
Drivers have to respond to a wide range of stimuli in their environment, all of which is subject 
to some level of uncertainty.  Tasks like these are not merely perceptual ones of seeing or 
hearing something, they are also cognitive: driver’s and pilot’s not only have to discriminate 
a ‘stimulus’ from within a ‘noisy’ environment, but correctly classify it and respond.  Signal 
detection Theory (SDT) formalises these concepts by separating out a person’s sensitivity to 
a stimuli (how easy it is to detect something) and their response bias (their preference for 
responding one way or another to the stimuli; Green & Swets, 1966).  SDT helps us to 
understand why a particular ‘stimulus’, which might be very loud, visible or unambiguous, is 
not always responded to in the ways we expect (or vice versa).  Signal Detection Theory 
classifies human responses to stimuli in the environment in four ways, either as a ‘hit’, ‘miss’, 
‘false alarm’ or ‘correct rejection’.  The ability to accurately detect stimuli in the environment 
and correctly classify them is the desired outcome.  Taking the example of AWS and the 
need to press a cancellation button in response to an in-cab warning, if the button was 
pressed in response to ANY warning indication this will ensure a 100% Hit rate but will also 
increase the rate of False Alarms.  Accuracy in this case is low.  If, on the other hand, the 
driver is trying to do the opposite, to avoid False Alarms and instead maximise Correct 
Rejections, they would not respond to ambiguous ‘signals’.  This would increase the number 
of Correct Rejections but it would also increase the number of ‘Misses’.  Accuracy in this 
case is also low.  Signal Detection Theory enables us to separate sensitivity (d’) from 
decision bias (C).  Sensitivity is a measure of accuracy and tells us how easy it is to 
distinguish a particular environmental stimuli (e.g. an in cab warning).  Decision bias tells us 
whether one response is more probable than another due to habit or other contextual 
influences.   
 
Method 
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The proof of concept was tested using three railway journeys from Ipswich to Felixstowe.  
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) was applied to the activation of the in-cab Automatic Warning 
System (AWS) in which driver responses could be categorised as follows: 
 
Table 6 – Driver responses to the in-cab Automatic Warning System (AWS) 
organised into Signal Detection Theory categories 
Status of AWS/TPWS System Number % Categorisation 
AWS Horn followed by reset 21 30% Hit 
AWS Horn followed by no response 0 0% Miss 
AWS Bell followed by reset or no 
activation followed by reset 
22 31% False Alarm 
AWS Bell followed by no response 28 39% Correct 
Rejection 
Totals 71 100%  
 
Outputs 
Sensitivity to a stimulus is given by the metric d-prime, which was calculated as follows: 
 
d’ = z(FA) – z(H) 
 
where z(H) is the number of Hits expressed as a z-value subtracted from the same Z-
transformed False Alarm rate.  The results obtained are shown in Table 7: 
 
Table 7 – Drivers sensitivity to Automatic Warning System (AWS) alerts 
Journey Hits Misses Correct 
Rejections 
False 
Alarms 
d-prime 
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1 5 0 11 0 4.65 
2 9 0 6 7 2.30 
3 7 0 11 15 2.13 
    Mean 3.03 
 
The d-prime figure measures the strength of the stimulus, which in this case is the in-cab 
warning provided by the AWS system.  A value of 3.03 indicates drivers are highly sensitive 
to it: in this situation it is unambiguous and easy to discriminate from the wider background 
of noise, distractions, other contextual factors etc.  Expressed more formally, the responses 
drivers’ are providing when an AWS warning is overlain on top of the ‘contextual noise’ is 
3.03 standard deviations ‘different’ from the responses they give when the signal is absent 
(and only the ‘contextual noise’ is present).  Sensitivity provides an important leading 
indicator concerning the discriminability of information needed for driver’s to develop 
accurate situational awareness.  This is because the same ‘stimuli’ may yield different levels 
of sensitivity depending on external/contextual factors.  A warning that was not expected, 
ambiguous, not fully understood or masked, for example, may lower sensitivity despite the 
fact that it is the same ‘objective’ warning (in terms of prominence, sound intensity level etc.).   
 
Decision bias/criterion is given by the metric c, which was calculated as follows: 
 
𝑐 =  −
𝑍(𝐻) + 𝑍(𝐹𝐴)
2
 
 
The results obtained are shown in Table 8.  Decision Bias is independent of sensitivity and 
relates not to the discriminability of the ‘signal’ but to the payoffs involved in making one 
response in favour of another.  Thus, regardless of how easy it is to discriminate a stimulus a 
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counter intuitive response may still be favoured.  This is because the consequences of False 
Alarms, Misses and Correct Rejections vary with the context.  Psychological research shows 
that decision bias is more unstable and situationally dependent than sensitivity and therefore 
a potentially valuable Leading Indicator.   
 
Table 8 – Results of decision bias (c) 
Journey Hits Misses Correct 
Rejections 
False 
Alarms 
Criterion 
1 5 0 11 0 0 
2 9 0 6 7 -1.21 
3 7 0 11 15 -1.26 
    Mean -1.24 
 
The mean decision bias value across the three sampled drivers was c = -1.24 which 
indicates a liberal bias.  Driver’s make more responses which indicate the AWS signal is 
present than it is absent.  In other words, they are prioritising False Alarms over Correct 
Rejections which, in turn, provides a clue as to the sorts of error that may be more likely to 
occur in future (i.e. warnings that are cancelled incorrectly).  Assuming drivers’ ‘internal 
responses’ to the AWS warning are normally distributed (as per Signal Detection Theory) it 
is possible to plot individual driver decision bias’ into Figure 7 which, in turn, provides an 
important diagnostic tool in defining risky psychological/decision making states.   
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Figure 7 - Cumulative probability plot showing the extent and direction of response 
biases exhibited by the drivers.   
 
According to Figure 7, Driver 1 shows no systematic bias in their responses to the AWS 
warning.  They respond correctly to the AWS warning on every occasion and his/her False 
Alarm rate is zero.  Drivers 2 and 3 are different.  They are exhibiting a strong ‘liberal 
response bias’ meaning they are much more inclined to exhibit ‘false alarm’ responses (and 
behavioural clusters 2 and 3 above).  With the ability to detect these changes in decision 
bias comes the possibility to analyse a) the extent to which different biases interact with 
accident/incident rates (i.e. is a liberal bias of this magnitude associated with particular types 
of risk) and b) how the context influences human decision making (and therefore how that 
context can be modified to ‘un-bias’ human responses).   
 
What is the leading indicator? 
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Leading Indicator 8:  Sensitivity provides a measure of how much useful information there is 
in the environment and the extent to which drivers can discriminate it from the background of 
contextual noise.  Warnings, stimuli and so forth may, in an engineering sense, appear to be 
unambiguous yet they may be considerably less so cognitively.  Sensitivity provides a 
measure of this which can, in turn, be associated with changing risk.   
 
Leading Indicator 9:  Decision bias reveals the likelihood that one type of driver response will 
be favoured and, in a wider application, how this interacts with risk.  In a wider application it 
would be possible to examine decision bias in a systematic way looking at differences 
between drivers and between particular routes. This could provide insight into driving styles 
and indicate whether particular aspects of a route result in a shift in decision bias.  For 
example, a specific AWS signal on a particular route may result in a high level of predictive 
cancellations/button pressing (high false alarms) relative to most others, identifying this as a 
more risky section of journey.  Relationships such as these would need to be established 
based on a future research but the feature itself is now detectable.   
 
Type of Risk Detected:  Getting out of sequence because of changing levels of sensitivity to 
environmental cues that trigger habitual behaviour.  Loss of situational awareness because 
of the detectability (or absence of detectability) of information in the environment.  Risk of a 
failure to understand what environmental cues might mean due to high levels of decision 
bias.  Faulty allocation of attention due to misdirected attention lowering sensitivity to other 
environmental stimuli.  Prior experience overrides correct action as revealed by shifts in 
decision bias as a result of highly routine journeys, experience and habit, biases that favour 
one response type in a multi-modal system, the role of conflicting information in reducing 
sensitivity and increasing misclassifications. 
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Conclusions 
Exabytes of data are routinely and continuously collected from normal journeys by On-Train 
Data Recorders (OTDR), but currently not used in a systematic fashion.  At the same time, 
not only are the opportunities to use OTDR data after accidents diminishing because of 
improving safety trends but we are left with a class of Human Factors problem that is difficult 
to predict based on previous occurrences.  Human Factors issues are a strategic risk and 
innovative new ways to work at this interface are required.  The research reported in this 
paper advances this agenda.  Table 9 summarises the nine leading indicator candidates that 
arise from coupling big-data to Human Factors methods and how they map to key risk types.   
 
Table 9 – Summary table of leading indicators mapped to risk types 
 Type of Risk Detected 
 Getting out 
of sequence 
Loss of 
situational 
awareness 
Faulty 
allocation of 
attention 
Prior experience 
overrides correct 
action 
Workload Profile: high/low 
events 
    
Workload Profile: change     
Workload Profile: rate of 
change 
    
Process Charts:  operations 
loading 
    
Process Charts: behavioural 
clusters 
    
Link Analysis: patterns of 
interaction 
    
Link Analysis: network metrics     
Sensitivity     
Decision bias     
 
The advantage of this approach is that Human Factors methods are able to bring with them 
a substantial and robust form of construct validity.  They have already been shown to 
provide access to the psychological issues that are of interest in detecting key risks, and as 
such provide a novel framework for interrogating big-data from OTDR devices.  Importantly, 
the process of review and proof of concept testing establishes the methods’ scalability:  
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Human Factors methods ‘can’ be driven from this new type of data and, furthermore, are 
amenable to software-based implementation.  This finding hints at future reductions in the 
analytical overhead required to perform these analyses, indeed, with more automation 
Human Factors leading indicators of the sort tested in this paper could become continuous 
key performance indicators, relying more on real-time data streams and analysis.  The 
possibilities are tantalising, but having proved the concept a number of important future 
research tasks are required.  Human Factors methods are able to demonstrate good 
construct validity and reliability (based on their substantial legacy of prior use and 
development) but another source of big-data needs to be combined with these candidate 
leading indicators.  This is currently underway.  This critical step is required in order to 
answer questions about whether identified risks around vigilance decrements, clusters of 
behaviour or decision bias find themselves implicated in actual incidents such as SPADs, 
overspeeding, wrong-side door releases and station over-runs.  The sensitivity of the leading 
indicators needs to be established, along with their predictive validity in terms of actual risk 
outcomes.  If this loop can be closed then we have a powerful new approach.  The big-data 
‘haystack’ may not be any smaller than it was previously, but the number of useful ‘needles’ 
to be found has been increased, and they are now easier to find.   
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